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CONFLICTING REPRESENTATIONS: 
LANI GUINIER AND JAMES MADISON ON 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
Mark A. Graber* 
Lani Guinier believes "that every citizen has the right to 
equal legislative influence."t For this, she has been assailed as a 
"Quota Queen" by politically correct conservatives more inter-
ested in sowing social discord than in promoting public delibera-
tion about American electoral systems.2 Although many, 
perhaps too many, passages in The Tyranny of the MajorityJ con-
centrate on the political problems of persons of color, the "one-
vote, one-value"4 voting schemes that Guinier proposes will not 
establish a fixed racial spoils system. Proportional representa-
tion (PR) permits persons to choose their political identities.s As 
Guinier notes, "[n]o one needs to decide in advance what a 
* Associate Professor of Government, University of Maryland at College Park. 
Copyright © 1996 by Mark A. Graber 
1. Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representa-
tive Democracy 124 (Free Press, 1994). Guinier alternates between speaking of "an equal 
opportunity to influence legislative policy," id. at 135, and "a fair chance to influence 
legislative policy-making." Lani Guinier, {£}racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 
108 Harv. L. Rev. 109, 126 (1994). See Guinier, Tyranny at 72, 74, 78, 116 ("equal" or 
"same"); id. at 40, 69, 70, I 04 ("fair"). 
2. See, e.g., Clint Bolick, Clinton's Quota Queens, Wall Street J. A12, A12 (Apr. 
30, 1993). One wonders whether Bolick will label conservative populist Kevin Phillips a 
"Kwota King" now that Phillips has endorsed some version of proportional representa-
tion. Kevin Phillips, Arrogant Capital: Washington, Wall Street, and the Frustration of 
American Politics 191-95 (Little, Brown and Co., 1994) ("the other far-reaching reform 
that deserves more attention is modifying our electoral system in the direction of propor-
tional representation ... "). Such proponents of proportional representation as John Stu-
art Mill and Arend Lijphart must also be "Kwota Kings." See John Stuart Mill. 
Considerations on Representative Government 139-64, especially 141, (Gateway Editions, 
Ltd., 1962) ("[i]n a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, 
not disproportionately, but proportionately"); Arend Lijphart, Comparative Perspectives 
on Fair Representation: The Plurality-Majority Rule, Geographical Districting, and Alter-
native Electoral Arrangements, 9 Policy Studies J. 899 (1980-81). 
3. Guinier, Tyranny (cited in note 1). 
4. ld. at 152. 
5. Strictly speaking, the cumulative voting schemes Guinier proposes, see Guinier. 
Tyranny at 149 (cited in note 1), are semiproportional. For a discussion of the distinction 
between proportional and semiproportional electoral systems, see Douglas J. Amy, Real 
Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proponional Representation Elections in the United 
States 186-87 (Columbia U. Press, 1993). 
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group is. The voters make that decision by the way they cast 
their ballots. "6 Indeed, she adds, " [ n ]o one needs to decide 
whether a minority group identity is the only or primary identity. 
The voters do that by the way they vote. "7 When a significant 
number of black voters support candidates committed to serving 
their perceived common interests as African-Americans, that 
group will have the power to elect what Guinier refers to as an 
"authentic" black representative.s Nevertheless, cumulative vot-
ing schemes permit the same number of whites, Ku Klux Klan 
members, plumbers, and Brooklyn Dodger fans to elect the "au-
thentic"9 representatives of their choice.to The virtue of propor-
tional representation is that such electoral systems minimize the 
voters "represented" by legislators they did not choose.n 
Lost in the hue and cry over whether race-neutral cumula-
tive voting schemes somehow amount to unwarranted special 
pleading for racial minorities is any serious discussion about 
Guinier's notion of representation and the probable impact of 
proportional representation on legislative support for racial jus-
tice. Although Guinier occasionally implies that her proposals 
are Madisonian,12 the electoral schemes set out in The Tyranny 
of the Majorityl3 seem more inspired by Anti-Federalist thought 
than by The Federalist Papers.l4 The Tyranny of the Majorityls 
advances a sophisticated and uncompromising theory of "interest 
representation."J6 In sharp contrast to Madison, who thought 
that properly designed institutions minimize self-interested vot-
ing and allow more public-spirited motives to hold sway in both 
6. Guinier, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 134 (cited in note 1). 
7. !d. See also Guinier, Tyranny at 137, 151-52 (cited in note 1). 
8. Guinier, Tyranny at 13 (cited in note 1 ). 
9. !d. 
10. Guinier, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 125 (cited in note 1) ("in choosing remedies to 
guarantee representation opportunities for politically cohesive racial groups, courts 
should select remedies that also have the potential to empower other politically cohesive 
groups"); id. at 133 n.l41; Guinier, Tyranny at 71, 98, 114, 117 (cited in note 1). For 
further discussion of how proportional representation avoids the need for racial gerry-
mandering, see infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
11. Guinier, Tyranny at 121-22, 151-52 (cited in note 1). For a detailed discussion of 
how votes are "wasted" in single-member districts, see Amy, Real Choices/New Voices at 
21-26, 41 (cited in note 5). See also John R. Low-Beer, The Constitutional Imperative of 
Proportional Representation, 94 Yale L.J. 163, 172-73, 182 (1984); Mary A. Inman, C.P.R. 
(Change Through Proportional Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 
141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1991, 1993-95, 1999, 2010 (1993). 
12. Guinier, Tyranny at 3-5 (cited in note 1). 
13. Guinier. Tyranny (cited in note 1). 
14. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison. and John Jay in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The 
Federalist Papers (Mentor, 1961). See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
15. Guinier, Tyranny (cited in note 1). 
16. !d. at 155. 
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electoral and legislative contests, Guinier prefers democratic pro-
cedures that harness representatives to the interests of their con-
stituents. Whereas Madison advanced a trustee model of 
representation that gave elected officials substantial leeway to 
deliberate independently about justice and the public good, 
Guinier's works advocate "a delegate model of representation" 
that will "ensure substantive accountability to constituents' pol-
icy preferences. . . "1 7 
This essay compares the ways in which Guinierian and 
Madisonian electoral systems purport to achieve racial justice. 
Although my sympathies are clearly with Madison, this paper 
does not make the definitive case against proportional represen-
tation. Instead, the following pages merely point out that a 
movement toward proportional representation in our society 
might weaken support for more egalitarian racial policies and 
suggest how the civil rights movement might benefit by less pop-
ulist understandings of representation. At the very least, I hope 
to clarify the conditions under which different electoral systems 
promote racial justice and to begin a more informed dialogue 
about the voting schemes among which Guinier would have 
Americans choose. 
GUINIER AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
Proponents of proportional representation celebrate the nu-
merous advantages of their preferred electoral system. Most of 
those virtues are procedural. Douglas Amy's Real Choices/New 
l'oices maintains that proportional representation "would mini-
mize wasted votes, give minor parties fair representation in our 
legislatures, improve the quality of campaigns, increase the 
number of women and racial minority officeholders, encourage 
more voter participation, and increase the responsiveness and le-
gitimacy of government. "Is In addition to purifying democratic 
17. Id. at 74. Other proponents of proportional representation similarly endorse 
delegate models of representation. Amy, for example, maintains "that legislatures should 
reflect as accurately as possible the political desires of the public .... " In his opinion, 
"we possess a rule for evaluating how democratic an election system is: How well does it 
produce a legislature that accurately mirrors the public's political preferences?" Amy, 
Real Choices/New Voices at 27 (cited in note 5). See Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality 
and Election Systems, 91 Ethics 375,384 (1981) ("the legislative body ought to be a micro-
cosm of the electorate"); Low-Beer, 94 Yale L.J. at 164 n.3, 176, 182 (cited in note 11). 
18. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices at 197 (cited in note 5). See id. at 1-152; Low-
Beer, 94 Yale L.J. at 183 (cited in note 11); Inman, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 2005-06 (cited in 
note 11); Edward Still, Alternati;·es to Single-Member Districts in Chandler Davidson, ed .. 
Minority Vote Dilution 249,252-53 (Howard U. Press, 1984). See also Sanford Levinson, 
Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why 
Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 257,270-72 (1985). 
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processes, a goal shared by some conservative populists,l9 liberal 
proponents of proportional representation expect that the adop-
tion of that electoral scheme would yield more desirable public 
policies. "[I]ncreased representation," Amy suggests, "means 
minority communities can better promote their political and eco-
nomic interests and focus more attention on what they see as 
pressing issues." "Imagine," he asks, "if twelve black United 
States senators, rather than none [or one], were pushing legisla-
tion on civil rights, affirmative action, urban renewal, and social 
welfare spending. Would this not make a significant 
difference?"2o 
Guinier similarly regards proportional representation as 
both an end in itself and a means for advancing the substantive 
goals of the civil rights movement. Although at times she claims 
that "[t]he issue here is one of procedure and process, not sub-
stantive justice,"21 other passages in The Tyranny of the Majority 
declare that "the real goal" of her proposals is to "alter the mate-
rial condition of the lives of America's subjugated rninorities."22 
Cumulative voting will "advanc[e] ... a progressive agenda,"23 in 
Guinier's opinion, by enabling significant political minorities to 
"assert their most salient interests and to hold their elected offi-
cials accountable for advocating those interests."24 Not only 
would proportional representation enable African-Americans 
and their political allies to elect more representatives, but that 
voting scheme also would inhibit those "black officials" from 
"defin[ing] their political agenda without reference to or consul-
tation with a community base."2s Hence, racial minorities could 
be confident that the officials they choose actually would repre-
sent them in legislative debates. 
Guinierian electoral institutions should serve some of their 
intended purposes. The cumulative voting schemes Guinier pro-
poses probably would enable persons of color to elect more pub-
lic officials committed to strengthening present civil rights laws. 
Amy persuasively argues that the party-list version of propor-
19. Phillips, Arrogant Capital at 191·95 (cited in note 2). 
20. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices at 115 (cited in note 5). See also id. at 9-10, 101. 
See generally Low-Beer, 94 Yale L.J. (cited in note 11); Inman, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1997, 
2005-06 (cited in note 11 ). Elsewhere in his book, Professor Amy admits that "it is clearly 
too soon to draw any conclusions about the final partisan implications of a move toward 
PR in the United States." Amy, Real Choices/New Voices at 33 (cited in note 5). 
21. Guinier, Tyranny at 187 (cited in note 1 ). 
22. Id. at 54. 
23. Id. at 44. 
24. Guinier, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 133 n.141 (cited in note 1). 
25. Guinier, Tyranny at 62 (cited in note 1 ). See id. at 74, 82-83. 
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tiona! representation is partly responsible for the more equitable 
representation of women and minorities in European legisla-
tures. In particular, he points to "the pressure on the parties ... 
to construct lists that represent the broad electorate ... so that 
their slates will have wide appeal. "26 No reason exists for think-
ing that proportional representation would have a different 
impact in the United States. Significantly, proportional represen-
tation would increase the number of black legislators without any 
recourse to the contentious racial gerrymanders that the 
Supreme Court recently declared unconstitutional in Shaw v. 
Reno27 and Miller v. Johnson.2s "[T]he controversial issues of re-
verse discrimination and reserving seats by race become irrele-
vant under proportional representation," Amy notes. "PR 
simply allows for the election of minority candidates, if they have 
voter support. "29 
In addition to increasing the number of black elected offi-
cials, institutional mechanisms that promote interest representa-
tion also are more likely than present electoral institutions to 
prevent those officials from developing independent priorities 
when in the legislature. Proportional representation encourages 
new parties and more issue-oriented parties (such as the Greens 
in Germany). This development, in practice, reduces the capac-
ity of elected officials to exercise their personal judgment on 
matters where their beliefs or interests diverge from those of 
their electorate.Jo The more parties, the more likely a voter can 
find candidates with whom he or she agrees on all salient issues.JJ 
Nevertheless, the practical consequences of electoral sys-
tems that aspire to give every citizen equal legislative influence 
are likely to be less progressive than their advocates hope. To 
the extent that proportional representation ensures that the 
26. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices at 108, 128-29 (cited in note 5). 
27. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
28. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). 
29. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices at 132 (cited in note 5). See Low-Beer, 94 Yale 
L.J. at 176 n.63 (cited in note 11) ("[u]nder aPR system ... , groups are left to define 
themselves-hence the term 'voluntary constituencies"'); Inman, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 
2011, 2044-45, 2048 (cited in note 11); Still, Single-Member Districts at 263 (cited in note 
18); Lijphart, 9 Policy Studies J. at 910 (cited in note 2). Indeed, by considering the elec-
torate as a whole (or in sufficiently large blocks), proportional representation effectively 
prevents gerrymanders of any sort. See Amy, Real Choices/New Voices at 42-54 (cited in 
note 5); Inman, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 2025, 2048 (cited in note 11 ). 
30. See Amy, Real Choices/New Voices at 67-73, 76-98 (cited in note 5) (discussing 
how proportional representation "[a]llows [i]ssue-oriented [c]ampaigns" and 
"[e]ncourag[es] [p]rincipled [p]oliticians" and discussing how proportional representation 
encourages minor parties devoted to pursuing the policy concerns of their electorate). 
31. See Inman, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 2013 (cited in note 11). 
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political center will control public policy,32 adopting that electo-
ral system will do little to improve the lot of less fortunate citi-
zens. Indeed, some recent public opinion polls suggest that 
proportional representation is more likely to augment the overall 
political strength of extreme racists than of persons committed to 
racial justice. Moreover, electoral schemes that tighten the ties 
between constituents and representatives reduce the probability 
that "authentic"33 conservative white representatives will support 
more liberal racial policies than their conservative white constitu-
ents favor. 
Hard as this may be for many left-wing academics to accept, 
recent opinion polls suggest that politically inefficacious white 
reactionaries may be more numerous than politically ineffica-
cious progressive persons of color. Contemporary surveys find 
that more Americans believe that present policies unduly favor 
blacks than think present policy favors whites. "Voter attitudes," 
the most recent Times Mirror Center poll found, "are punctuated 
by increased indifference to the problems of blacks and poor 
people."34 Approximately half the citizenry believes that "we 
have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country," and 
that "blacks who can't get ahead in this country are mostly re-
sponsible for their own condition. "35 Popular majorities also are 
prepared to jettison those welfare policies that disproportion-
ately service racial minorities. Eighty-five percent of Americans 
agree that "poor people have become too dependent on govern-
ment assistance programs," and most disagree with claims that 
"the government should help more needy people even if it means 
going deeper in debt."36 
If these surveys are accurate, then proportional representa-
tion schemes that enable the Rainbow Coalition to elect ten 
more representatives also would enable the Christian Coalition 
(or other very conservative groups) to elect fifteen more repre-
32. Amy notes that "PR governments are typically coalition governments, and coali-
tion politics tends to be compromise politics. These coalition governments are thought to 
be less likely to adopt radical policies-of either the left or the right. ... " Amy. Real 
Choices/New Voices at 172 (cited in note 5). 
33. Guinier, Tyranny at 13 (cited in note 1) .. 
34. The People, the Press & Politics: The New Political Landscape 4 (Times Mirror 
Co., 1994). 
35. !d. at 129, 153. Overwhelming national majorities oppose affirmative action pro-
grams. ld. at 154. 
36. Id. at 155, 153. Strong majorities also support two year limits on welfare and 
laws preventing illegal immigrants from receiving any state assistance. I d. at 142-43. See 
Public Supports New Programs To Get People Off Welfare, 344 The Gallup Poll Monthly 
2, 2 (May 1994) (54% want welfare spending reduced or ended, 10% want welfare spend-
ing increased). 
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sentatives.37 Thus, should all Americans have an equal influence 
on public policy, the best that persons of color could hope for is 
that present policies might be retained. Moreover, some survey 
evidence suggests that members of one racial minority would not 
benefit from the increased representation of members of other 
racial minorities. "[M]inorities," several studies find, hold "more 
negative views of other minorities than do whites."3s These ra-
cial and ethnic tensions may further exacerbate existing gaps be-
tween African-Americans and other citizens, should proportional 
representation be adopted. Changes in electoral systems that in-
crease the power of Asian-Americans in California, for example, 
are not likely to result in more affirmative action policies at state 
colleges and universities. 
Guinier suggests that the application of cumulative voting 
schemes in legislative decisionmaking might enable racial minori-
ties to win some votes on matters of lower priority to racist 
whites.39 Both the history of the populist movement and con-
temporary voting studies, however, indicate that many less fortu-
nate whites place higher priority on measures that maintain the 
racial status quo than on redistributive measures that might im-
prove the lot of most lower-middle and lower class citizens. "Just 
as race was used, between 1880 and 1964, by the planter-textile-
banking elite of the South to rupture class solidarity at the bot-
tom of the income ladder," Thomas and Mary Edsall note, "race 
as a national issue over the past twenty-five years has broken the 
Democratic New Deal 'bottom-up' coalition-a coalition depen-
dent on substantial support from all voters, white and black, at or 
below the median income. "4o 
37. David Plotke suggests that proportional representation in the United States 
would probably result in the following political alignment: "left party, 3-5 percent; black 
party, 5-10 percent; center-left party. 30-35 percent; independent center party, 5 percent; 
right-center party, 35-40 percent; Christian right party, 10-15 percent." David Plotke, 
David Plotke Replies, 42 Dissent 526, 529 (1995). See Levinson, 33 UCLA L. Rev. at 274 
(cited in note 18) (noting how the Klan might be one beneficiary of proportional repre-
sentation). Amy recognizes that PR would "allow for the election of a few white 
supremacists," Amy, Real Choices/New Voices at 176 (cited in note 5), but he underesti-
mates, in my view, the relative gains such political movements might make under PR. 
38. Steven A. Holmes, Sun·ey Finds Minorities Resent One An01her Almost as Much 
as They Do Whites, N.Y. Times 88, 88 (Mar. 3, 1994). 
39. Guinier, Tyranny at 108 (cited in note 1 ). 
40. Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, 
Rights, and Taxes on American Politics 5-6 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1992). See Lawrence 
Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America 299 (Oxford U. Press, 
1976) ("the received cultural inheritance of white supremacy continued to hold a greater 
sway over Southern whites than issues of economic reform did, however ably such issues 
were articulated by Populist spokesmen"). 
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Of course, public opinion polls are not always the most relia-
ble indicators of popular sentiment. People respond in different 
ways over short time intervals to the same question,4t and slight 
changes in the wording of survey questions may yield dramatic 
changes in responses.42 Studies no doubt exist that offer a more 
liberal assessment of contemporary public attitudes toward race 
and poverty than those discussed in this essay.43 The great dan-
ger, however, is that the most favorable public opinion polls will 
be deemed authoritative by progressive proponents of propor-
tional representation simply because they are favorable. For 
those who admit they lack the expertise necessary to determine 
whether the Times Mirror Poll is a more accurate barometer of 
public opinion than, say, the Gallup Poll, the best conclusion 
seems to be that the average American may have more liberal 
attitudes toward race and poverty than the average Republican 
member of the 104th Congress44 but that American race and wel-
fare policies would not become much more liberal and might be-
come more conservative should all citizens have an equal 
influence on the making of those policies.4s 
When the probable consequences of proportional represen-
tation are fully acknowledged, Guinier's hope that representa-
tives will not deviate from their constituents' interests seems less 
attractive. The very forces that yoke authentic black representa-
tives to their black constituencies presumably will yoke "authen-
tic''4o conservative white representatives to their conservative 
white constituencies. A system that maximizes the incentives for 
elected officials to act as delegates rather than trustees would, for 
41. See Richard Morin, Poll Finds Disapproval of GOP's Budget Plans, Washington 
PostAl, A4 (May 16, 1995) (noting an 18 percent increase over several months in public 
opposition to further cuts in welfare). 
42. One survey found that "average support for more assistance for the poor is 39 
percentage points higher than for welfare." Tom W. Smith, That Which We Call Welfare 
by Any Other Name Would Smell Sweeter: An Analysis of the Impact of Question Wording 
on Response Pauerns, 51 Pub. Op. Q. 75, 76 (1987). See Fay Lomax Cook and Edith J. 
Barrett, Support for the American Welfare State: The Views of Congress and the Public 27 
(Columbia U. Press, 1992). For a more general discussion of "response instability," see 
John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion 53-96 (Cambridge U. Press, 
1992). 
43. See, e.g., Nancy Lewis, Survey at Odds With Welfare Reform Plans; According to 
Poll, People Want More Social Spending, Officials of Sponsoring Group Say, Washington 
Post A3. A3 (July 18, 1995). 
44. See Morin, Washington Post at Al (cited in note 41); Richard L. Berke, Poll 
Finds Public Doubts Key Parts of G.O.P.'s Agenda, N.Y. limes Al, Al (Feb. 28, 1995). 
45. Significantly, perhaps, even studies that find opposition to draconian cuts in wel-
fare find that most Americans oppose affirmative action, even in cases where past race 
discrimination exists. See Berke, N.Y. Times at Al (cited in note 44). 
46. Guinier. Tyranny at 13 (cited in note 1). 
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these reasons, yield no more racial justice than the median voter 
demands. As the above surveys suggest, that is not a lot of racial 
justice. 
The crucial question that proponents of strong civil rights 
laws must therefore ask is whether refining or abandoning dele-
gate models of representation would best promote racial justice. 
Unfortunately, The Tyranny of the Majority47 sidesteps this diffi-
cult issue. This omission is partly explained by Guinier's dubious 
assumption that proportional representation primarily would 
empower marginalized voters on the left.48 Hence, designing in-
stitutions that enable those representatives to use their independ-
ent judgment seems a bad idea. More significantly, Guinier 
consistently maintains that geographical districting is a primitive 
form of interest representation.49 This mistake leads her to over-
look the alternative way in which the Madisonian model of rep-
resentation purports to achieve racial justice. 
THE MADISONIAN ALTERNATIVE 
In sharp contrast to the electoral schemes proposed by The 
Tyranny of the Majority,so The Federalist PaperssJ advocates insti-
tutions that minimize self-interested behavior at every step of the 
political process. "Madison," Stephen Elkin notes, "did not 
think that law-making should substantially revolve around pref-
erence aggregation and bargaining among interests. It was in-
stead to be deliberative in form, looking toward legislating in the 
public interest."sz Regarding "politics [as] a process ... of creat-
ing a collective order with a shared vision and sense of public 
interest[,]" Madison and his constitutional collaborators dis-
dained any "electoral scheme" that would "implicitly encourag[e] 
more partial, single-issue stances, vis-a-vis the rest [of] the fellow 
members of the electoral marketplace. "s3 Elections, in 
47. Guinier, Tyranny (cited in note 1). 
48. Thus, she suggests that feminists are the other likely beneficiary of cumulative 
voting schemes. See Guinier, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 134 (cited in note 1); Guinier, Tyranny 
at 100-01 (cited in note 1). See generally id. at 114 (suggesting that left-wing groups in 
general will benefit from her electoral proposals); Guinier, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 137 (cited 
in note 1). 
49. Guinier,108 Harv. L. Rev. at 127 (cited in note I); Guinier, Tyranny at 127. 151-
52 (cited in note I). 
50. Guinier, Tyranny (cited in note 1). 
51. The Federalist Papers (cited in note 14). 
52. Stephen L. Elkin, Pegs & Wholes, 5 Good Society 11, 12 (Fall 1995). 
53. Levinson, 33 UCLA L. Rev. at 274-75 (cited in note 18). See Nancy L. 
Schwartz, The Blue Guitar: Political Representation and Community 5-6 (U. of Chicago 
Press, 1988); Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law 122 
(Harvard U. Press, 1985); Mark E. Rush, In Search of a Coherent Theory of Voting Rights: 
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Madison's opinion, served to identify those persons who could 
best transcend the parochial concerns of their electorates. "The 
aim of every political constitution," he wrote, "is ... first to ob-
tain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and 
most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society."s4 Fortu-
nately, the American Constitution was well designed from that 
perspective. Ratification, John Jay declared, would guarantee 
that "the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, 
but also will generally be appointed to manage [the polity]."ss 
Large voting districts were crucial to the Madisonian quest 
for public-spirited representatives. Publius defended vast geo-
graphic legislative districts because he thought that such electoral 
units increased the number of worthy candidatess6 and forced 
voters to transcend parochial concerns when making electoral 
choices. Because no person could "authentically"s7 represent a 
heterogenous district, Madison assumed that voters in the consti-
tutional order would select the person with the best reputation 
for political judgment. Elections, he thought, would "center on 
men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive 
and established characters. "ss 
Those representatives were expected to exercise their in-
dependent judgment on most issues and not to be tethered to the 
Challenges to the Supreme Court's Vision of Fair and Effective Representation, 56 Rev. of 
Pol. 503, 508 (1994). 
54. Federalist 57 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 350, 350 (cited in note 14). 
55. Federalist 3 (Jay) in The Federalist Papers 41,43 (cited in note 14). See Federal· 
ist 4 (Jay) in The Federalist Papers 45, 47 (cited in note 14); Federalist 64 (Jay) in The 
Federalist Papers 390, 391 (cited in note 14) (explaining why the presidential appointment 
systeJTl will secure "those men only who have become the most distinguished by their 
abilities and virtue"); Federalist 64 (Jay) in The Federalist Papers 391, 396 (cited in note 
14); Federalist 68 (Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers 411, 412 (cited in note 14) (explain-
ing why the presidential selection system will result in the election of the best person); 
Federalist 76 (Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers 454, 455, 458-59. For a fuller discussion 
of this claim and the claims made in the next four paragraphs, see Gordon S. Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 at 499-518 (U. of North Carolina Press, 
1969); Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in Eng· 
land and America 237-306 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1988). 
56. Federalist 10 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 77,82 (cited in note 14); Feder-
alist 27 (Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers 174, 174 (cited in note 14). 
57. Guinier. Tyranny at 13 (cited in note 1). 
58. Federalist 10 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 77, 83 (cited in note 14). See 
Federalist 57 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 350, 354 (cited in note 14) (explaining 
why a large electorate is more likely than a small one to choose a "fit representative"). 
As Professor Nancy Schwartz points out, Madison opposed single-member districts be-
cause he thought they were too small. Instead, Madison preferred to elect all representa-
tives at large from each state. "[T]he way to have representatives give 'an attention to the 
interest of the whole Society,"' the Father of the Constitution wrote, was '"by making 
them the choice of the whole Society."' Schwartz, Blue Guitar at 5 (cited in note 53) 
(quoting Madison). 
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particular interests of their electorates. The very point of repre-
sentation, Publius asserted, was "to refine and enlarge the public 
views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of 
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their 
country .... "s9 "[I]t may well happen," he declared, "that the 
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, 
will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by 
the people themselves .... "60 Because he regarded public offi-
cials in a well-ordered regime as having special capacities to as-
certain the public good, Hamilton believed that "[t]he republican 
principle ... does not require an unqualified complaisance to 
every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse 
which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter 
their prejudices to betray their interests."6I When public opinion 
and public interest conflict, Hamilton maintained that it is "the 
duty of the persons whom [the people] have appointed to be the 
guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion 
[of the people] in order to give them time and opportunity for 
more cool and sedate reflection."6z Madison similarly thought 
that the Senate "may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the 
people against their own temporary errors and delusions."63 
The Federalist Papers64 provides institutional support for this 
firmness by insisting that elected officials serve terms long 
enough to ensure that representatives will not be immediately 
accountable to their constituents for every unpopular vote.6s The 
length of the presidential and senatorial terms, in particular, 
were expected to give the people's representatives the leeway 
necessary to exercise their judgment rather than to defer to the 
immediate policy demands of their less informed constituents. 
The Senate, Madison wrote, "ought to hold its authority by a ten-
ure of considerable duration" owing to "the propensity of all sin-
gle and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden 
59. Federalist 10 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 77, 82 (cited in note 14). 
60. !d. 
61. Federalist 71 (Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers 431, 432 (cited in note 14). 
62. !d. 
63. Federalist 63 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 382, 384 (cited in note 14). See 
Jonathan Elliot, ed., 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution 40 (J.B. Lippincott Co., 1941) (quoting James Iredell) ("the Senate 
should not be at the mercy of every popular clamor"). 
64. The Federalist Papers (cited in note 14). 
65. Lengthy terms of office also were thought necessary to give representatives the 
"practical knowledge requisite to the due performance" of their duties, Federalist 53 
(Madison) in The Federalist Papers 330, 332 (cited in note 14), a consideration that would 
not be very relevant if representatives were expected to exercise little independent 
judgment. 
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and violent passions .... "66 Long terms were also necessary for 
government to initiate projects whose benefits were not immedi-
ately visible.67 The Framers would not, of course, have repre-
sentatives govern indefinitely in the face of public opinion. Still, 
they believed that a public official should have a lengthy enough 
term to guarantee "that there would be time enough before [the 
next election] to make the community sensible of the propriety 
of the measures he might incline to pursue."6s 
Elected officials in a well designed republic with large elec-
tion districts and reasonable terms of office, Madison thought, 
would be better able to identify and protect fundamental rights 
than the average citizens. Hence, if Guinier's conception of ra-
cial justice is superior to that of the median voter, then the virtu-
ous legislators in a Madisonian system who use their independent 
judgment are more likely than their constituents to favor strong 
civil rights laws. Moreover, elected officials not tethered by pub-
lic opinion may profit from legislative debate on racial matters. 
Assuming that intelligent deliberation generally improves peo-
ple's conception of justice and the public good, then the greater 
the independent judgment of the representative, the more likely 
that representative is to realize after articulate legislative de-
fenses of various racial policies that the measures favored by 
most persons of color are morally and constitutionally superior 
to the present status quo. 
Nowhere is the difference between Guinierian and Madis-
onian electoral systems plainer than when Guinier asserts "[i]f 
the majority wields disproportionate power based on its 
prejudices, I conclude that in extreme circumstances majority 
domination may become majority tyranny."69 This remarkable 
sentence implies that Adolf Hitler and Martin Luther King ought 
66. Federalist 62 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 376, 379 (cited in note 14). For 
a similar analysis of the presidential term, see Federalist 71 (Hamilton) in The Federalist 
Papers 431, 431-34 (cited in note 14); Federalist 72 (Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers 
435. 437 (cited in note 14). 
67. Federalist 63 (probably Madison) in The Federalist Papers 382, 383-84 (cited in 
note 14). 
68. Federalist 71 (Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers 431, 434 (cited in note 14). 
Similarly, Publius regarded judicial review as a useful institution only when '"a momentary 
inclination happens to lay hold of a majority." Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in The Federalist 
Papers 464, 469 (cited in note 14). Publius offers no institutional device for preserving 
constitutional rights when a majority is committed to violating the liberties of the 
minority. 
69. Guinier, Tyranny at 72 (cited in note 1 ). 
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to have "an equal opportunity to influence legislative policy."7o 
The main problem with Nazi policy, apparently, is that vicious 
anti-Semites exercised disproportionate power. Had German 
Jews merely been barred from all professions in 1935, no 
majoritarian tyranny would have occurred as defined by Guinier 
because German majorities would have been exercising propor-
tionate power based on their prejudices. No doubt Guinier be-
lieves that other non-electoral political institutions must remedy 
particularly inegalitarian policies. Her strong defense of propor-
tional political power, however, seems to legitimate all expres-
sions of social prejudice, as long as no individual's bigotries count 
for more than another person's bigotries. At the very least, 
Guinier's critics seem correct when they note the absence of 
"normative standards to bring to bear against the bad guys, be-
cause everyone is entitled to some satisfaction."7t 
Madison proposed a different definition of majority tyranny. 
Majority tyranny occurs, in his view, whenever majorities make 
policies "adverse to the rights of other citizens. "n Thus, the Fed-
eralist Papers73 promotes institutions that purport to minimize 
the influence of any prejudice on public policy and not institu-
tions that rest content when all prejudices are equally repre-
sented. Publius insists that "it is the reason, alone, of the public, 
that ought to control and regulate the government. The pas-
sions," in his view, "ought to be controlled and regulated by the 
government. "74 Thus, a contemporary Madisonian representa-
tive would be more inclined to make policies reflecting the belief 
that racism is wrong than policies reflecting the proper balance 
between the 60% of the populace that favor white supremacy, 
the 10% that favor black supremacy and the 30% that favor ra-
cial equality. 
Contemporary politics offer some support for claims that 
persons of color would benefit from a political system that left 
representatives freer than at present to act on their personal no-
tions of the public good. Legislative shirking on civil rights ques-
tions has never been studied systemically,7s but some evidence 
70. Id. at 135. See Rush, 56 Rev. of Pol. at 518 (cited in note 53) (asking whether 
"the American Nazi party" is "to have 'a fair chance of having its needs and desires 
satisfied,"'). 
71. Id. at 518-19. 
72. Federalist 10 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 77, 78 (cited in note 14). 
73. The Federalist Papers (cited in note 14). 
74. Federalist 49 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 313, 317 (cited in note 14). See 
Federalist 50 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 317, 319 (cited in note 14). 
75. An early study did find that elected officials were more likely to defer to constit-
uent opinion on civil rights questions than on other legislative issues. Warren E. Miller 
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suggests that most legislators are inclined to support more liberal 
race policies than their constituents prefer. Surveys find that the 
better educated citizens most likely to become political leaders 
are more tolerant of racial minorities and less tolerant of such 
groups as the Ku Klux Klan than the average citizens.76 Given 
the electoral backlash that began in 1966, good reason exists for 
doubting whether the median voter favored measures as compre-
hensive as the Civil Rights Acts of 196477 and the Voting Rights 
Act of 196578. Finally, with the exception of the Reagan and 
Bush administrations (and the Rehnquist Court that was packed 
by those administrations), those institutions furthest removed 
from popular support have been most responsive to claims of ra-
cial justice during the twentieth century. The presidency has in 
general been more liberal than the national legislature; the fed-
eral judiciary has in general been more liberal than the 
presidency. 
Madisonian systems have their faults. Institutional mecha-
nisms that weaken ties between constituents and representations 
may strengthen ties between representatives and politically privi-
leged interest groups. Progressive reformers sought to increase 
popular control over Congress because national representatives 
were taking advantage of their relative freedom from direct con-
trol to serve business interests instead of the public good.79 
Moreover, elected representatives (and judges) tend to be well-
off, highly educated, white males inclined to confuse their class 
interests with fundamental rights.so Thus, American elites histor-
ically have been more concerned with negative freedoms from 
government interference than with positive rights to government 
assistance. 
Significantly, leading opponents of the Constitution antici-
pated Guinier's attack on the elitism of the Constitution's electo-
ral schemes1 and demanded the smaller electoral districts they 
and Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 Am. Pol. Science Rev. 45, 
56 (1963). 
76. See John L. Sullivan, James Piereson and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance 
and American Democracy 92-106 (U. of Chicago Press, 1982). 
77. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000-2000h (1994). 
78. 42 U.S.C.§ 1973-1973bb (1994). 
79. See David Graham Phillips, The Treason of the Senate 58-215 (Quadrangle 
Books, 1964). 
80. See Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 765, 771 (1982); 
Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 Chi. 
Kent. L. Rev. 89, 105 (1988) ("[r]ather than natural right, judges are more likely to im-
pose upon us the prejudices of their class"). 
81. For the central role fears of aristocracy played in Anti-Federalist thought, see 
Wood, American Republic at 483-99 (cited in note 55). 
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thought were more likely to achieve proportional representa-
tion.s2 The Federal Farmer called for "a full and equal represen-
tation ... in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views of 
the people are collected in such manner as they would be were 
the people all assembled." "Each order," in his opinion, "must 
have a share in the business of legislation actually and effi-
ciently."s3 "Representation," the Impartial Examiner agreed, 
"should be such as to comprehend every species of interest 
within the society."s4 He and other Anti-Federalists condemned 
the large election districts mandated by the Constitution because 
"[w]hen ... the number of representatives in a legislature is very 
small ... , they are inadequate to, and cannot sufficiently respect, 
all the complicated, variant and opposite interests, which must 
necessarily subsist in a commonwealth .... "ss 
Guinier's affinity for Anti-Federalist principles may discredit 
her effort to obtain Madisonian credentials,s6 but not her under-
lying political commitments. Madison may have triumphed in 
1787, but, as Gordon Wood suggests, that triumph was short-
lived.B7 For 200 years, the American political system has been 
evolving toward the more populist order Guinier envisions.sx In-
deed, the Madisonian notions of a common good and persons 
with distinct capacities to ascertain that common good seem for-
eign to the more democratic and less republican constitutional 
regime of the late twentieth century. Nevertheless, if Guinier's 
proposals are to receive the intelligent debate they deserve, 
scholars and citizens must recognize that the alternative to inter-
est representation is not territorial representation but a form of 
representation that sees good government as something more 
than the fair aggregation of everyone's policy preferences. 
82. See Levinson, 33 UCLA L. Rev. at 261-63 (cited in note 18). For a suggestion 
that Guinier's "neopluralism echoes almost word for word the writings of John Calhoun." 
see Rush, 56 Rev. of Pol. at 514 (cited in note 53). 
83. 7 Letters from The Federal Farmer (Dec. 31, 1787) in Herbert J. Storing, ed., 2 
The Complete Ami-Federalist 214, 265-266 (U. of Chicago Press, 1981). 
84. 3 Essays by The Impartial Examiner in Herbert J. Storing, ed., 5 The Complete 
Anti-Federalist 172. 192 (U. of Chicago Press. 1981). 
85. Id. 
86. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
87. Gordon S. Wood. The Radicalism of the American Revolution 229-369 (Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1992). 
88. ld; John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Rn·iew 98-100 
(Harvard U. Press, 1980). 
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OUR CHOICE 
The central question of representative government is 
whether electoral systems should minimize or maximize the im-
pact of public opinion on public policy.s9 Everyone agrees that 
legislators in a democratic republic should ultimately be account-
able to the people. No one thinks that every governmental actor 
should be controlled by popular sentiment all of the time. The 
issue is the extent to which public officials should be harnessed 
by public opinion. Guinier prefers a tighter relationship than at 
present. Madison sought a much looser bond. 
If this debate is to be resolved in part on consequentialist 
grounds, then constitutional commentators must rely on some-
thing more than convenient empirical assumptions when promot-
ing their pet electoral reforms. Proponents of proportional 
representation must carefully study public opinion and public 
priorities when determining the probable impact of their pre-
ferred voting schemes on electoral and legislative decisionmak-
ing. Madisonians (or conservative democratic theorists) must 
determine whose interests and rights get protected when legisla-
tors are not immediately accountable to the people. At a mini-
mum, constitutional and political theorists must recognize when 
they are making empirical assertions and learn how to back up 
those assertions with empirical evidence. 
By assuming without sufficient evidence that political 
marginalization is primarily a left-wing phenomenon, The Tyr-
anny of the Majority9o and other neo-populist works9I obscure 
the fundamental choice that proponents of racial justice must 
make between institutions that loosen or tighten the bonds be-
tween the citizenry and its elected representatives. Persons of 
color are certainly entitled to their fair share of the spoils of a 
politics of self-interest, but American practice suggests that such 
spoils will be meager. Citizens who regard a semi-permanent un-
derclass as a public curse and racial discrimination as a public 
evil might better achieve their more egalitarian ends by support-
ing electoral institutions that promote rights and the common 
good. Taking this step, however, may require persons on the left 
to abandon romantic conceptions of a people willing to imple-
89. See Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 145 (U. of California 
Press, 1967). 
90. Guinier, Tyranny (cited in note 1). 
91. See Richard D. Parker, "Here, the People Rule": A Constitutional Populist Mani-
festo 88-93 (Harvard U. Press, 1994) (assuming without any empirical support that 
"[m]ost oppression ... is the work of [elite] minorities" who should be checked by "the 
majority of ordinary people"). 
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ment the latest rage in critical (whatever) studies and recognize 
that political justice might best be promoted by those persons 
trained to deliberate on matters of public importance. 
